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957 
THE SWORD OF DAMOCLES: HOW THE FAIR USE DEFENSE 






The invention and popularity of electronic devices and 
computer programming has rapidly changed our lives.  The software 
on computers and phones brings human life to a new era, makes 
people’s lives more convenient, and encourages people to express 
their brilliant ideas.  Software developers express their ideas through 
writing lines of code, weave the code into software that can achieve 
certain functions, which in turn makes people’s lives more colorful 
and convenient when they use electronic devices.  Copyright law is 
dedicated to protecting creators’ rights while maintaining creativity.  
However, technology companies should be aware of a Sword of 
Damocles1 hanging above their heads: copyright infringement.2   
 
 J.D. Candidate, Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center, Class of 2021. I 
would like to thank Professor Rena C. Seplowitz, Mike Petridis, and Katherine R. 
Carroll for their help with the issues. 
1 Evan Andrews, What was the Sword of Damocles? HISTORY (Feb. 17, 2016), 
https://www.history.com/news/what-was-the-sword-of-damocles. “The sword of 
Damocles is now commonly used as a catchall term to describe a looming danger.” 
2 Will Kenton, Copyright Infringement, INVESTOPEDIA (Jun. 12, 2020), 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/copyright-infringement.asp. “Copyright 
infringement is the use or production of copyright-protected material without the 
permission of the copyright holder.” Id. 
1
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Fair use, as an affirmative defense, excuses unauthorized uses 
from copyright infringement.3  Its purpose is to “reconcile the 
respective speech-suppressive and speech-protective positions.”4  
However, the fair use defense is very confusing, especially when it is 
applied in the software area, and thus it is hard for tech companies to 
predict the courts’ decisions.5  Although fair use can be analyzed 
through four statutory factors, courts often struggle to resolve the 
ambiguities in the statutory language and how to weigh the statutory 
factors.6  Therefore, courts tend to have their own different 
interpretations and standards, and they often disagree with each 
other.7 
This Note analyzes the fair use doctrine in the computer 
programming area.  Part II of the Note discusses the history of 
copyright protection in the computer programming field and the fair 
use doctrine.  Part II. A i and ii addresses the software development 
and intellectual property protection and merger doctrine in the 
computer program area.  Part II. A iii and iv reviews the software 
copyright protection’s legislative history and copyright jurisprudence.  
Part II. B discusses the background of the fair use doctrine.  Part II. C 
analyzes two representative cases involving fair use doctrine in the 
software area in depth.   
 
3 Eric J. Schwartz, Joking Aside: Recent Copyright Infringement Cases Reexamine 
the Distinction between Satire and Parody in Determining Fair Use, 30-MAY L.A. 
LAW 33 at *1 (2007). 
4 Ned Snow, The Forgotten Right of Fair Use, 62 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 135, 138 
(2011). 
5 Matthew Sag, Predicting Fair Use, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 47, 48-49 (2012). 
6 Fair Use, JUSTIA, https://www.justia.com/intellectual-property/copyright/fair-
use/(last updated Apr. 2018). 
7 Id.; see, e.g., Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 2013) (“[t]o qualify as a fair 
use under copyright law, a new work generally must alter the original with new 
expression, meaning, or message”); Seltzer v. Green Day, Inc., 725 F.3d 1170 (9th 
Cir. 2013) (“an allegedly infringing work is typically viewed as transformative as 
long as new expressive content or message is apparent, this is so even where—as 
here—the allegedly infringing work makes few physical changes to the original or 
fails to comment on the original”); Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation LLC, 766 F.3d 756 
(7th Cir. 2014) (questioning Second Circuit’s transformative use test set forth in 
Cariou because ask exclusively whether the work is transformative will replace the 
list in 17 U.S.C. § 107 and it would also override derivative works protection set 
forth in 17 U.S.C. § 106(2)). 
2
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In Part III, the Note comments on the Supreme Court’s recent 
decision in Google LLC v. Oracle America Inc.8  This Note focuses 
on Google’s fair use applicability issue.  The Note argues that the 
Court correctly incorporated the public benefit consideration into the 
fair use doctrine yet failed to go further to provide detailed guideline 
on how to consider the public benefit properly.  Additionally, the 
Note contends that the Supreme Court correctly held that Google’s 
use was transformative, yet the Court should have provided a clear 
definition of “transformative use.”  Moreover, the Note states that the 
Supreme Court correctly held that Google’s use did not harm 
Oracle’s actual or potential markets.  Finally, the Note calls for the 
Court to provide a clear standard for weighing the four statutory fair 
use factors.  
II. BACKGROUND  
A. Copyright protection in computer programming  
The legislative history of the Copyright Act9 provides insight 
into the interaction of copyright protection and the software industry. 
i. Software Development 
Software is a tool for humans to instruct the computer how to 
execute tasks.10  Software consists of data and various programming 
instructions.11  The instructions are written by lines of code, which is 
the way that computer programmers express their ideas.12  The 
ultimate usage of software is to make computers execute tasks, which 
makes the software capable not only of expressing ideas but also 
serves a functional purpose.13 
 
8 886 F.3d 1179 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
9 Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976) (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 17 U.S.C.). 
10 Micah Yost, A Brief History of Software Development, MEDIUM (Jan. 25, 2018), 
https://medium.com/@micahyost/a-brief-history-of-software-development-
f67a6e6ddae0.  
11 Id.  
12 Id. 
13 Ralph Oman, Computer Software As Copyrightable Subject Matter: Oracle v. 
Google, Legislative Intent, And The Scope Of Rights In Digital Works, 31 HARV. J. 
 
3
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Software has decades of history. Tom Kilburn wrote the first 
software in 1948.14  The software industry has developed quickly 
since the 1980s when personal computers were invented and then 
became more accessible to society.15  In the 1990s, the open-source 
software entered the mainstream.16  Open-source software can be 
inspected, modified, and enhanced.17  Students can use the open-
source software to learn how to improve software, the source code 
can inspire computer programmers, and even non-programmers can 
benefit from the software by making changes and customizing it.18  
After mobile devices like smartphones entered the market and 
became popular, applications used on mobile devices began to 
explode.19  Today, almost everybody relies on computers and mobile 
devices to work and socialize.20  The software industry continues to 
evolve, producing software and applications that make people’s lives 
more convenient. 
ii. Intellectual Property protection for computer 
programs and the merger doctrine 
 
Technology has developed more rapidly than the law.  
Policymakers struggled to create laws that would effectively protect 
software work and protect the rights of developers and tech 
companies.21  Intellectual property law protects authors’ rights in 
their creative works that include literature, art, and musical 
 
LAW & TECH. 639, 644 (2018), 
https://jolt.law.harvard.edu/assets/articlePDFs/v31/31HarvJLTech639.pdf.  
14 Yost, supra note 10. 
15 Id. 
16 Id. 
17 What is open source?, OPENSOURCE.COM (Nov. 1, 2012), 
https://opensource.com/resources/what-open-source. 
18 Id.  
19 Yost, supra note 10. 
20 Kristen Herhold, How People Use Social Media in 2018, THE MANIFEST (Oct. 
17, 2018), https://themanifest.com/social-media/how-people-use-social-media-
2018. 
21 See Peter S. Menell, Rise of the API Copyright Dead?: An updated epitaph for 
copyright protection of network and functional features of computer software, 31 
HARV. J. LAW & TECH. 305, 314 (2018). 
4
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compositions.22  Software consists of lines of code written by an 
engineer, making it a literary work.  Thus, software easily falls into 
the intellectual property system.23   
Patent law protects new inventions that are useful.24  The goal 
for computer programs is to serve a functional purpose; it makes 
perfect sense to protect computer programs under patent law.  
However, patent law application is thought to be time-consuming and 
costly, and the period of protection is short.25   
Copyright law has long served as a tool to protect aesthetic 
creativity.26  Copyright law protects “literary, musical, dramatic, and 
choreographic works, pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or 
sculptural works.”27  However, the copyright does not protect any 
“idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, 
principle, or discovery.”28  Computer programs consist of a 
programming “operation, concept, principle, or discovery.”29  
Considering the low application price, easy application process, and 
long period of protection, computer programs are suitable for 
copyright protection.30 
However, fitting software into copyright protection can be 
hard because of the difficulty of separating the functional from the 
creative expression.  Merger doctrine in the computer software area 
was born in Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp.31  
Under the merger doctrine, the expression of a particular idea is not 
protected by copyright when there is effectively only one way or a 
few ways to express that idea.32  It can be used as a complete defense 
 
22 See 17 U.S.C. § 101. 
23 See Menell, supra note 21.  
24 What is Patent Law?, FINDLAW (June 20, 2016), 
https://www.findlaw.com/hirealawyer/choosing-the-right-lawyer/patents.html.  
25 See Peter S. Menell, Tailoring Legal Protection for Computer Software, 39 
STAN. L. REV. 1329, 1347-51 (1987). 
26 See 17 U.S.C. § 102. 
27 Id. 
28 See id. § 102 (b). 
29 See id. 
30 Menell, supra note 21, at 314. 
31 714 F.2d 1240, 1253 (3d Cir. 1983). 
32 See Lewis R. Clayton, COPYRIGHT LAW the Merger Doctrine, THE NAT’L L.J. 
(June 6, 2005); Guodong Fu, GOOGLE V. ORACLE: Weighing Fair Use Factors 
in Software Copyright Infringement Cases, 2020 B.C. INTELL. PROP. & TECH. F.1, 4 
(2020). 
5
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to copyright infringement in computer program cases,33 or it can be 
related to the copyrightability issue.34  In the computer program area, 
the idea/expression merger is not the only type of merger; courts have 
also dealt with some process/expression mergers.35  Merger doctrine 
is critical in the case law relating to copyright protection in the 
computer program area because computer programs have both a 
literary nature, expressed by written code, and a utilitarian nature, 
instructing computers to execute certain tasks.  The merger doctrine 
can make computer programs uncopyrightable because it is difficult 
to distinguish between the expression and the idea or process.  
iii. Copyright legislative history   
Faced with the dilemma of fitting software into copyright law 
protection, Congress established the National Commission on New 
Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works (CONTU) in 1974.36  
CONTU’s purpose is to study issues arising from copyrighted works 
in the software area and recommend revisions of federal intellectual 
property law.37  As a temporary solution, Congress included software 
within the scope of copyright protection in the Copyright Act of 1976 
(1976 Act).38  However, the rest of the 1976 Act provisions 
“maintained traditional exclusions of ideas and functional features.”39   
 
33 Pamela Samuelson, Reconceptualizing Copyright’s Merger Doctrine, 63 J. 
COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 417, 428 (2016); see Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static 
Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522, 540-41 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding that exact 
copying excused on merger grounds because it was necessary for achieving 
compatibility).  
34 See, e.g., Kregos v. Assoc. Press, 937 F.2d 700, 705 (2d Cir. 1991). 
35 See, e.g., Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., Ltd., 9 F.3d 823, 837-38 
(10th Cir. 1993) (“[C]opyright protection is denied to expression that is inseparable 
from or merged with the ideas, processes, or discoveries underlying the 
expression.”); Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of America, Inc., 975 F.2d 832 (Fed. 
Cir. 1992) ( “[I]f the patentable process is embodied inextricably in the line-by-line 
instructions of the computer program . . . the process merges with the expression 
and precludes copyright protection.”). 
36 Jule Sigall, Copyright Infringement was Never this Easy: RAM Copies and their 
Impact on the Scope of Copyright Protection for Computer Programs, 45 CATH. 
U.L. REV. 181, 187 (1995). 
37 Id. 
38 Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976), (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 17 U.S.C.). 
39 See Menell, supra note 21, at 315. 
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After careful consideration, CONTU concluded that the 
computer software work should be protected under copyright law, 
even though copyright law’s essential principle is not to protect any 
idea.40  CONTU recommended two modest changes to the 1976 Act: 
(1) defining a computer program as “a set of statements or 
instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to 
bring about a certain result”; and (2) allowing “the rightful possessor 
of a copy of a computer program” to run the program and to make a 
backup copy of the program without infringement liability.41  The 
CONTU Final Report further indicated that while “one is always free 
to make a machine perform any conceivable process (in the absence 
of a patent) . . . one is not free to take another’s program,” subject to 
copyright’s limiting doctrines, originality, and the idea-expression 
dichotomy.42   
Congress agreed with CONTU and in its 1980 amendments to 
federal copyright law, incorporated CONTU’s recommendation.43  
The 1980 amendments defined the term “computer program” as “a 
set of statements or instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a 
computer in order to bring about a certain result.”44  Congress 
intended that software developers and tech companies could be 
protected by copyright law for their “programming design and coding 
choices to the extent that the expression was separable from the 
underlying ideas while recognizing limitations on copyright 
protection for computer programs.”45  In this way, the creative effort 
in a software developing process gains protection from infringement, 
 
40 Id. 
41 FINAL REPORT OF THE NAT’L COMM’N ON NEW TECHNOLOGY USES OF 
COPYRIGHTED WORKS (1979) http://digital-law-online.info/CONTU/contu6.html 
[hereinafter CONTU Final Report]. 
42 Id. Courts have treated CONTU’s Final Report as legislative history for the 1980 
amendments to the 1976 Act. See Apple Comput., Inc. v. Franklin Comput. Corp. 
714 F.2d 1240, 1252 (3d Cir. 1983); Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 
255, 260-61 (5th Cir. 1988). 
43 Act of Dec. 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3007, 3028 (1980) (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.). 
44 17 U.S.C. §101. 
45 See Peter S. Menell, API Copyrightability Bleak House: Unraveling and 
Repairing the Oracle v. Google Jurisdictional Mess, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
1515, 1521 (2016). 
7
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whereas the underlying idea and “unoriginal programming choices 
remain free for others to use.”46 
iv. Copyright jurisprudence 
Courts struggled to identify the line between protected and 
unprotected computer software.  For example, the Ninth Circuit 
recognized that “[c]omputer programs pose unique problems for the 
application of the ‘idea/expression distinction’ that determines the 
extent of copyright protection.”47  The court further noted that 
“[t]here is no settled standard for identifying what constitutes a 
protected expression and what constitutes an unprotected idea in 
cases involving copyright infringement issues in computer software 
because of the hybrid nature of computer programs.”48  This Note 
analyzes some of the important copyright infringement cases in the 
software area. 
1. Whelan Associates, Inc. v. Jaslow 
Dental Laboratory, Inc.49 
The owner of a dental laboratory hired a software firm to 
design a computer program for the laboratory that would organize the 
bookkeeping and administrative tasks.50  Whelan, the principal 
programmer, customized a computer program that runs on the 
laboratory’s IBM Series One computer.51  According to the parties 
agreement terms, Whelan would retain the copyright in the program, 
and her company would use its best efforts to improve the program, 
and the laboratory would use its best efforts to market the program.52  
Later, one of the officers and shareholders of the laboratory created a 
version of the program that could run on other computer systems and 
started marketing the program.53  Whelan sued the laboratory for 
 
46 See Menell, supra note 21, at 315. 
47 Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1524 (9th Cir. 1992). 
48 Id. 
49 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986). 
50 Id. at 1225. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. at 1226. 
53 Id. 
8
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copyright infringement.54  The district court held in favor of Whelan, 
reasoning that both of the programs’ “structure and the overall 
organization were substantially similar.”55  The issue on appeal was 
whether similarity in the overall structure of the programs triggered 
copyright infringement.56    
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals used “a single substantial 
similarity inquiry according to which both lay and expert testimony 
would be admissible.”57  The court suggested that: 
[T]he purpose or function of a utilitarian work would 
be the work’s idea, and everything that is not 
necessary to that purpose or function would be part of 
the expression of the idea. Where there are many 
means of achieving the desired purpose, then the 
particular means chosen is not necessary to the 
purpose; hence, there is expression, not idea.58 
Using this standard, the Third Circuit held that the functionality of 
the program was to “aid in the business operations of a dental 
laboratory.”59  The structure of the program “was not essential to that 
task,” for there were programs that existed that “perform[ed] the 
same functions but have different structures.”60  The structure of the 
program, therefore, was part of the expression that was 
copyrightable.61  The court’s single-step substantial similarity test has 
been criticized by numerous cases for being too simplified and 
overbroad.62  
2. Computer Associates International, 
 
54 Id. at 1227. 
55 Id. at 1228-29. 
56 Id. at 1234. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. at 1236 (citation omitted). 
59 Id. at 1238. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. at 1239. 
62 See, e.g., CMAX/Cleveland, Inc. v. UCR, Inc., 804 F. Supp. 337, 352 (M.D. Ga. 
1992) (“Unfortunately, the simplicity that makes the test so attractive, also makes it 
‘conceptually overbroad’ and ‘descriptively inadequate.’”); Comput. Assocs. Int’l., 
Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 775 F. Supp. 544, 559 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) (criticizing Whelan test 
as inadequate and inaccurate). 
9
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Inc. v. Altai, Inc.63 
Computer Associates (“CA”) developed and sold a program 
named SCHEDULER, which was a job scheduling program designed 
for IBM mainframe computers.64  The program was successful partly 
because it had a sub-program called ADAPTER that enabled 
SCHEDULER to be compatible with “three operating systems: 
DOS/VSE, MVS, and CMS.”65  The users can use SCHEDULER on 
any of IBM’s three mainframes without the need to customize their 
programs.66  In 1982, Altai, another computer software company, 
began marketing its own job scheduling program named ZEKE.67  
Altai wanted to make an MVS version of ZEKE and decided that the 
best way to achieve this goal was to introduce a “common system 
interface” component into ZEKE, and the new component-program 
was named OSCAR 3.4.68  Thirty percent of OSCAR’s code was 
copied directly from CA’s ADAPTER program.69  After CA served 
the summons and complaint on Altai, it immediately took action to 
rewrite the program and developed OSCAR 3.5.70  Despite Altai’s 
effort to rewrite OSCAR, CA sued Altai for copyright infringement.71 
At trial, the District Court focused on comparing the 
similarities between ADAPTER and OSCAR 3.5.72  The most 
important evaluation factor – code, “presents no similarity at all” 
since Altai rewrote the program.73  The court further found that “only 
a few of the lists and macros were similar to protected elements in 
ADAPTER.”74  The other similarities were either functional elements 
or in the public domain, neither of which is protectable under 
copyright law.75  The court ruled in favor of Altai because there was 
 
63 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992). 
64 Id. at 698. 
65 Id.  
66 Id. at 699. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. at 699-700. 
69 Id. at 700. 
70 Id.  
71 Id. 
72 Comput. Assocs. Int’l., Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 775 F. Supp. 544, 560-62 (E.D.N.Y. 
1991). 
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no substantial similarity between the two programs.76  On appeal, CA 
argued that the district court erred in ruling the OSCAR 3.5 and the 
ADAPTER were not substantially similar.77 
To determine this issue, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals 
used the abstraction-filtration-comparison test.78  The court fleshed 
out the framework of the three-step test: 
In ascertaining substantial similarity under this 
approach, a court would first break down the allegedly 
infringed program into its constituent structural parts. 
Then, by examining each of these parts for such things 
as incorporated ideas, expression that is necessarily 
incidental to those ideas, and elements that are taken 
from the public domain, a court would then be able to 
sift out all non-protectable material. Left with a kernel, 
or possible kernels, of creative expression after 
following this process of elimination, the court’s last 
step would be to compare this material with the 
structure of an allegedly infringing program.79 
The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s 
decision that the two systems were not substantially similar 
by using Judge Pratt’s three-step analysis.80  Both courts 
agreed that after OSCAR was rewritten, there was no 
substantial similarity between the two programs’ parameter 
lists and macros.81  The Second Circuit also agreed with the 
district court’s holding that the “overlap exhibited between 
the list of services required”82 for two programs did not count 
as substantial similarity because that was “dictated by the 
nature of other programs with which it was designed to 
interact and, thus, is not protected by copyright.”83  The 
Second Circuit’s three-step test is a useful method to deal 
 
76 Id. 
77 Comput. Assocs. Int’l., Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 701 (2d Cir. 1992). 
78 Id. at 706. The three-step test originated from Judge Learned Hand’s 
“abstractions test” in Nichols v. Univ. Pictures, 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930). 
79 Comput. Assocs., 982 F.2d at 706. 
80 Id. at 715; see Comput. Assocs. Int’l., Inc., 775 F. Supp. 544. 
81 Comput. Assocs., 982 F.2d at 714. 
82 Id. at 715. 
83 Id.  
11
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with nonliteral expression copying and to separate the 
unprotectable parts from the protectable ones, which is 
necessary since it is meaningless and incorrect to compare 
unprotectable parts to see whether the two software are 
substantially similar.     
3. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft 
Corp.84 
On March 17, 1988, Apple Computer, Inc. (Apple) filed claim 
against Microsoft Corp. (Microsoft) for copyright infringement.85  
After Microsoft released Windows 1.0, Apple complained that it had 
a similar graphical user interface (GUI) with Apple’s programs.86  
The two companies then “agreed to a license, which gave Microsoft 
the right to use and sublicense derivative works generated by 
Windows 1.0 in current and future products.”87  Subsequently, 
Microsoft released Windows 2.0 and Windows 3.0; its licensee, 
Hewlett-Packard Company (“HP”), introduced NewWave 1.0 and 
NewWave 3.0 that “run in conjunction with Windows to make IBM-
compatible computers easier to use.”88  Apple sued Microsoft 
because it believed that new versions exceeded the license scope and 
thus infringed its copyright.89  The license agreement Apple and 
Microsoft signed in 1985 stated that Microsoft had the right to use the 
“visual displays” generated by Apples’ GUI programs, which 
appeared as derivative works in Windows 1.0.90   
At trial, the District Court analyzed the license visual displays 
that were in the Windows interface.91  The court “dissected the 
Macintosh, Windows, and NewWave interfaces” to decide whether 
they are copyrightable and found a handful of elements in NewWave 
that were protectable.92  Finally, the court stated that it would 
 
84 35 F.3d 1435 (9th Cir. 1994). 
85 Apple Comput., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp, 759 F. Supp. 1444, 1447 (N.D. Ca. 
1991). 
86 Apple v. Microsoft, 35 F.3d at 1438. 
87 Id.  
88 Id. 
89 Id. 
90 Id. at 1440. 
91 Id. at 1438. 
92 Id.  
12
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compare those protectable elements in NewWave with Apple 
elements to find whether they are substantially similar, and it would 
compare NewWave and Windows 2.0 and 3.0 as a whole with 
Apple’s works for virtual identity.93  The court held in favor of 
Microsoft and HP.94 
Apple contended that “visual display” was ambiguous, and 
the license did not authorize Microsoft to make later Windows 
versions look more like Apple’s programs than Windows 1.0 
looked.95  Apple further contended that the district court erred by 
using its dissection method, which was to “dissect the unlicensed 
elements in order to determine whether remaining similarities lack 
originality.”96  The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected Apple’s 
argument based on the fact that Apple licensed the right to “copy 
almost all of its visual displays” and “the limited number of ways that 
the basic ideas of the Apple GUI can be expressed differently.”97  
The court noted that the GUI were partly artistic and partly 
functional, which helped enhance the user’s communication with the 
computer.98  Since the creativity of the GUI was restrained by the 
power and speed of the computer, design alternatives would limit the 
GUI’s function and make it harder to use.99  
GUI audiovisual works can be analytically dissected using the 
same process as used in other works.100  The court proposed a three-
step test, similar to the Second Circuit’s test in Altai.101  After using 
this dissection method, the district court held, and the Ninth Circuit 
affirmed, that no copyright infringement had occurred.102  The three-




95 Id. at 1440. 
96 Id. at 1439. 
97 Id. at 1442.  
98 Id. at 1444. 
99 Id. 
100 Id. at 1445; see also Data East USA, Inc. v. EPYX, Inc., 862 F.2d 204 (9th Cir. 
1988) (using analytical dissection to determine whether the similarities of the 
audio-visual works embodied in video games resulted from unprotectable 
expression). 
101 Apple v. Microsoft, 35 F.3d at 1445; see Comput. Assocs. Int’l., Inc. v. Altai, 
Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 706-11 (2d Cir. 1992). 
102 Apple v. Microsoft, 35 F.3d at 1439-40. 
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elements, thus providing expanded use in the area of software 
copyright.  
4. Lotus Development Corp. v. Borland 
International., Inc.103 
In Lotus, Lotus Development Corp. (Lotus) had copyrighted 
Lotus 1-2-3, a spreadsheet program.104  It enabled users to perform 
accounting functions on computers.105  Lotus 1-2-3 also allowed 
users to write “macros,” which enabled users to designate a series of 
command choices without the need to type the whole series every 
time the users tried to run certain commands.106  Borland 
International Inc. (Borland) released the Quattro program, which 
included the Lotus menu command hierarchy to make the Quattro 
compatible with Lotus 1-2-3.107  Borland copied the “words and 
structure of Lotus’s menu command hierarchy” but did not copy any 
of Lotus’s computer codes, even though the Quattro and its later 
versions looked virtually identical to the Lotus 1-2-3 menu tree.108  
Borland offered  users the “Lotus Emulation Interface,” which 
allowed users to choose either Borland’s menu commands or Lotus’s 
command structure.109 
The District Court held that Lotus’s menu command hierarchy 
was copyrightable expression because there were so many possible 
alternate command words for the ten commands that appear in 
Lotus’s main menu.110  After the District Court’s ruling, Borland 
removed the Lotus Emulation Interface.111  However, Borland’s 
programs were still partially compatible with Lotus 1-2-3.112  After a 
lengthy process, the district court ordered a permanent injunction 
against Borland.113  Borland appealed and conceded it copied the 
 
103 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995). 
104 Id. at 809. 
105 Id. 
106 Id. 
107 Id. at 810. 
108 Id. 
109 Id.  
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Lotus menu command hierarchy but argued that Lotus’s 1-2-3 menu 
command hierarchy was not protected under copyright law because 
“it is a system, method of operation, process, or procedure” that is 
covered by 17 U.S.C. § 102 (b).114 
The First Circuit noted it was a “matter of first impression” 
when deciding whether the Lotus command hierarchy was 
copyrightable.115  This case was different from Altai and the three-
step test was not applicable since the test was only useful when 
dealing with nonliteral copying, but the case here involved Borland’s 
literal copying of the Lotus menu command hierarchy.116  The First 
Circuit held that the expression of Lotus was not copyrightable 
because “it is part of Lotus 1-2-3’s ‘method of operation.’”117  The 
court explained: 
 
We think that “method of operation,” as that term is 
used in §102(b), refers to the means by which a person 
operates somethings, whether it be a car, a food 
processor, or a computer. Thus, a text describing how 
to operate something would not extend copyright 
protection to the method of operation itself; other 
people would be free to employ that method and to 
describe it in their own words. Similarly, if a new 
method of operation is used rather than described, 
other people would still be free to employ or describe 
that method.118 
 
The court compared the Lotus menu command hierarchy to the video 
cassette recorder (VCR), reasoning that the Lotus command terms 
were equivalent to the buttons that control the VCR instead of the 
label on the VCR buttons.119  The First Circuit’s reasoning made 
more sense than the district court’s decision, for although there could 
be different ways to achieve the same goal (here, to execute 
 
114 Id. at 812. 
115 Id. at 813. 
116 Id. at 814-15; see Comput. Assocs. Int’l., Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 706-
11 (2d Cir. 1992). 
117 Id. at 816. 
118 Id. at 815. 
119 Id. 
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commands), that does not necessarily mean that the way to achieve 
this goal is expression.  Using the First Circuit’s VCR example, the 
buttons on the VCR could have different shapes, but fundamentally, 
the buttons themselves are just the tool to “operate” the VCR. 
There is no settled standard to determine the copyright 
infringement issue in the computer programming area.  When dealing 
with nonliteral copying expression between programs, the three-step 
test is very helpful, for it dissects the programs to separate 
copyrightable parts from ones that are not.  This makes it easier for 
courts to compare the similarities between original and infringing 
programs.  When dealing with a literal copying issue, the three-step 
test may not be so useful; courts should determine whether the 
original program is copyrightable by deciding whether part or all of 
the original program falls into subject matters that are not 
copyrightable under section 102 (a).  If so, there can be no copyright 
infringement, even if literal copying occurred. 
B. The Fair Use Doctrine 
Fair use is an affirmative defense that excuses unauthorized 
users from copyright infringement.  It was an English common law 
doctrine that was carried over to the United States.120  There was no 
legislative guidance for courts to apply the fair use defense.  From the 
very beginning of copyright protection, some of the fair use of 
copyrighted materials had been considered necessary to fulfill 
copyright’s purpose, “to promote the Progress of Science and useful 
Arts.”121  As Justice Story explained,  
[I]n truth, in literature, in science and in art, there are, 
and can be, few if any, things, which in an abstract 
sense, are strictly new and original throughout.  Every 
book in literature, science and art, borrows, and must 
necessarily borrow, and use much which was well 
known and used before.122  
 
120 See WILLIAM F. PATRY, THE FAIR USE PRIVILEGE IN COPYRIGHT LAW 3-26 (2d 
ed. 1995) (tracing the English common law roots of the fair use doctrine). 
121 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 575 (1994) (quoting U.S. 
CONST. Art. I, § 8, cl. 8). 
122 Emerson v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615, 619 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (No. 4, 436). 
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Lord Ellenborough expressed the necessity to protect copyright 
material and to allow others to build upon it when he wrote, “while I 
shall think myself bound to secure every man in the enjoyment of this 
copy-right, one must not put manacles upon science.”123   The 
Supreme Court looked at history and noted that “[E]nglish courts 
held in some cases that in some instances ‘fair abridgment’ would not 
infringe an author’s rights.”124  Although the First Congress enacted 
the initial copyright statute without explicitly referring to “fair use,” 
the doctrine was recognized by the American courts nonetheless.125 
In Folsom v. Marsh,126 Justice Story examined earlier cases 
and distilled the methodology of applying fair use defense, noting 
that the courts should “look to the nature and objects of the selections 
made, the quantity and value of the materials used, and the degree in 
which the use may prejudice the sale, or diminish the profits, or 
supersede the objects, of the original work.”127  The fair use defense 
remained a common law issue until Congress passed the 1976 
Copyright Act, which states: 
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 
106A, the fair use of a copyrighted work, including 
such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or 
by any other means specified by that section, for 
purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, 
teaching (including multiple copies for classroom 
use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement 
of copyright. In determining whether the use made of 
a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to 
be considered shall include— 
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including 
whether such use is of a commercial nature or is 
for nonprofit educational purposes; 
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; 
 
123 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 575. 
124 Id.at 576; see Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105 
(1990). 
125 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 576. 
126 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No.4, 901). 
127 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 576 (quoting Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 
(C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4, 901)). 
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(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion 
used in relation to the copyrighted work as a 
whole; and 
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market 
for or value of the copyrighted work.128 
Congress intended 17 U.S.C. § 107 “to restate the present 
judicial doctrine of fair use, not to change, narrow, or enlarge it in 
any way” and intended that courts continue the common-law tradition 
of fair use adjudication.129  The fair use doctrine thus requires courts 
to be more flexible when applying the fair use statute and avoid rigid 
application when doing so would stifle the creativity the law is trying 
to encourage.130  However, this is not to simplify the fair use doctrine 
with bright-line rules, for the fair use doctrine calls for case-by-case 
analysis.131  The statute’s use of terms “including” and “such as,” is 
not meant to exclude other uses; it provides only general guidance 
about the sorts of copyright that courts most commonly had found to 
be fair uses.132  Also, when applying the fair use doctrine, courts will 
not treat the four statutory factors in isolation.133  The courts explore 
all the factors and weigh the results together.134 
In a fair use analysis, courts first consider “the purpose and 
character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial 
nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes.”135  The central 
purpose of the inquiry is for courts to see whether the new work 
merely “‘supersedes the objects’ of the original creation,”136 or 
instead “adds something new, with a further purpose or different 
character, altering the first with new expression, meaning, or 
 
128 17 U.S.C. § 107. In 1992, Congress amended § 107 of the Copyright Act to 
make clear that “[t]he fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding 
of fair use if such finding is made upon consideration of all the above factors.” See 
Fair Use of Copyrights Works, Pub. L. No. 102-492, 106 Stat. 3145 (1992) 
(codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 107). 
129 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 66 (1976). 
130 Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 236 (1990). 
131 Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985); Sony 
Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 448 (1984). 
132 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577-78 (1994). 
133 Id. at 578. 
134 Id. 
135 17 U.S.C. § 107(1). 
136 Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No.4, 901). 
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message.”137  In other words, courts ask whether the new work is 
“transformative.”138  Generally speaking, the transformative nature of 
the work is the most important consideration: the more 
transformative the new work, the less significant the other factors 
will be, which may weigh against a finding of fair use.139  Even 
though the courts do not have to necessarily find the work 
transformative to hold it as fair use, transformative use will generally 
further the copyright goal, which is to “promote science and the 
arts.”140 
The second factor courts consider is “the nature of the 
copyrighted work.”141  This factor requires courts to recognize that 
“some works are closer to the core of intended copyright protection 
than others, and thus fair use is more difficult to establish when the 
former works are copied.”142  Generally speaking, the courts evaluate 
the “value of the materials used.”143  The more factual a plaintiff’s 
original work is, the more likely the courts will find fair use.  
However, this factor is not as important as other factors, for 
unauthorized users almost always copy publicly known, expressive 
works.144 
The next factor is for courts to evaluate whether “the amount 
and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted 
work as a whole are reasonable in relation to the purpose of the 
copying.”145  Courts inquire whether the alleged infringer’s 
justification for the particular use is persuasive, and then the inquiry 
relates back to the first statutory factor, since courts recognize that 
the extent of permissible copying varies with the purpose and 
character of the use.146  In Campbell, the Court emphasized that “this 
factor calls for thought not only about the quantity of the materials 
used, but about their quality and importance, too.”147 
 
137 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579. 
138 Id.  
139 Id. 
140 Id. 
141 17 U.S.C. § 107(2). 
142 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586 (quoting Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas at 348). 
143 Id.  
144 Id. The Court referred particularly to parodies in Campbell. 
145 Id. (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 107(3)). 
146 Id. at 586-87. 
147 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 587. 
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The final factor courts evaluate is “the effect of the use upon 
the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.”148  
Campbell explained that: 
 
It requires courts to consider not only the extent of 
market harm caused by the particular actions of the 
alleged infringer, but also “whether unrestricted and 
widespread conduct of the sort engaged in by the 
defendant . . . would result in a substantially adverse 
impact on the potential market” for the original.149 
 
If evidence shows substantial harm to the market, courts may weigh 
against parody work for fair use, since licensing of derivatives is also 
an important economic incentive to the creation of originals.150 
 
C. Fair Use Application in Computer Programming 
Regime 
In computer program copyright infringement cases, the courts 
do not have many chances to deal with the fair use defense.  This Part 
analyzes two representative software cases where the courts analyzed 
the fair use defense.151 
1. Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc.152 
Sega Enterprises Ltd. (“Sega”) is a Japanese corporation that 
developed and marketed video entertainment systems, including the 
“Genesis console” and video game cartridges.153  Sega licensed its 
copyrighted computer code to independent computer game software 
 
148 Id. at 590 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 107(4)). 
149 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 590 (quoting 3 M. Nimmer & D. Nimmer, Nimmer on 
Copyright § 13.05 [A][4], p. 13-103.61 (1993)). 
150 Id. at 593; see 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (copyright owner has rights to derivative 
works). 
151 See, e.g., Sony Comput. Ent., Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596 (9th Cir. 
2000); Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am. Inc., 975 F.2d 832 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
152 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992). 
153 Id. at 1514.  
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developers.154  The licensees developed and sold Genesis-compatible 
video games to compete with Sega.155 Accolade, Inc. (“Accolade”) 
was an independent developer, manufacturer, and computer 
entertainment software marketer.156  Although Accolade considered 
entering into a licensing agreement with Sega, it eventually 
abandoned the effort.157 
To make its video games compatible with the Genesis 
console, Accolade used a two-step process.158  First, it “reverse 
engineered”159 Sega’s video game programs in order to learn the 
requirements for compatibility with the Genesis console, and it 
created a development manual, which contained the information it 
had discovered in the reverse engineering process.160  Second, 
Accolade created its own games for Genesis relying on the 
development manual.161  In the second round of reverse engineering, 
Accolade added the code from Sega to its development manual as a 
“standard header file to be used in all games.”162  The file contained 
approximately twenty to twenty-five bytes of data.163  But Accolade’s 
games contained a total of 500,000 to 1,500,000 bytes.164 
In 1991, Sega sued Accolade claiming copyright 
infringement.165  The district court held in favor of Sega and rejected 
Accolade’s fair use defense.166  On appeal, the Court of Appeals for 
 
154 Id.  




159 Brian Hess, What is Reverse Engineering and How Does it Work? ASTRO 
MACHINES WORKS (Sept. 9, 2019), https://astromachineworks.com/what-is-
reverse-engineering/. Reverse engineering, also called backwards 
engineering or back engineering, is the process by which an artificial 
object is deconstructed to reveal its designs, architecture, code or to 
extract knowledge from the object. Id. 
160 Sega v. Accolade, 977 F.2d at 1514-15. 
161 Id. at 1515. 
162 Id. at 1516. 
163 Id.  
164 Id.  
165 Id. at 1517. 
166 Id.   
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the Ninth Circuit considered whether Accolade’s use constituted fair 
use.167 
The Ninth Circuit weighed four factors of the fair use defense 
to determine whether Accolade had infringed  Sega’s copyright.168  
Copying for commercial use creates a presumption of unfairness, 
which can be rebutted by the particular commercial use.169  The court 
rejected Sega’s argument that Accolade copied the code to produce a 
competing product, and thus, was precluded from finding fair use, 
holding that the court needed to consider other aspects of “the 
purpose and character of the use” as well.170  The court further 
reasoned that although Accolade’s ultimate goal was to market 
Genesis-compatible video games, it copied the code solely for 
discovering the functional requirements to make the video games 
compatible with the Genesis console.171  This aspect of Sega’s 
programs was not protected by copyright.172  Since it is necessary for 
Accolade to deconstruct the Sega’s video game programs to learn the 
compatibility requirement and to make changes to its own games to 
make them compatible with Genesis console, Accolade could use no 
other methods to achieve this purpose since Accolade had never 
entered into a licensing agreement with Sega.173 
Further, the court recognized that particular use could bring 
public benefit, which is what the Copyright Act intended to 
promote.174  Accolade’s identification of “the functional requirements 
for Genesis compatibility has led to an increase in the number of 
independently designed video game programs offered for use with 
the Genesis console.”175  Independent developers could thus develop 
video games that can be used on Genesis’s console.176  As a result, 
more video games would be compatible with the Genesis console and 
 
167 Id. 
168 Id. at 1520-27. 
169 Id.; Hustler Mag., Inc. v. Moral Majority, Inc., 796 F.2d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir. 
1986). 
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known by consumers.  Even if the Genesis-compatible games were 
not scholarly works that did not alter the court’s judgment.177 
As to the second factor, the court recognized that there was no 
settled standard for identifying what is protected expression and what 
is an unprotected idea in computer software copyright infringement 
cases because of computer programs’ hybrid nature.178  The court did 
not agree with the Third Circuit test in Whelan that the idea or 
function of a computer program is the idea of the program as a whole, 
and everything that is not necessary to that purpose or function is part 
of the expression of that idea, as this test was overbroad and too 
simplistic.179  Instead, the court agreed with the Second Circuit’s test 
set forth in Altai180 that breaks down a computer program into 
component subroutine and then identifies each part’s core functional 
element.181 
The court agreed with Sega that Accolade “copied protected 
expression.”182  However, the court also recognized that computer 
programs are special, for people cannot gain access to the 
unprotected ideas and functional concepts without disassembling the 
code, and there is no viable alternative way to achieve this goal.183  
Thus, for the second factor, the court held in favor of Accolade, 
because disassembling is necessary to learn the functional 
requirements of the Genesis console compatibility.184 
As to the third factor, since Accolade disassembled entire 
programs written by Sega, the court held against Accolade.185  
However, the court also noted that this factor alone does not preclude 
a finding of fair use.  Since the ultimate use was limited, the court did 
 
177 Id. 
178 Id. at 1524. 
179 Id. at 1525; see, e.g., Peter Menell, An Analysis of the Scope of Copyright 
Protection for Application Programs, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1045, 1074 (1989); John 
Englund, Idea, Process, or Protected Expression?: Determining the Scope of 
Copyright Protection of the Structure of Computer Programs, 88 MICH. L. REV. 
866, 881 (1990). 
180 See Comput. Assocs. Int’l., Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 706-11 (2d Cir. 
1992). 
181 Sega v. Accolade, 977 F.2d at 1525. 
182 Id. 
183 Id. 
184 Id. at 1526. 
185 Id. 
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not weigh this factor too significantly in the whole fair use 
analysis.186 
As to the fourth factor, the court acknowledged that 
Accolade’s use affected the market for Genesis-compatible games in 
an indirect fashion.187  However, video game users typically purchase 
more than one game, and therefore there is no basis to assume that 
Accolade’s games have a significant impact on Sega’s games, since 
customers may purchase both.188  An attempt to monopolize this 
market by making it impossible for others to compete is against the 
statutory purpose to promote creative expression.189  Thus, the court 
ruled in favor of Accolade on this factor.190 
After weighing the four factors, the Ninth Circuit reversed the 
district court’s decision in favor of Accolade.191  The court’s analysis 
was correct and ensured that the fair use defense would not be overly 
rigid.  It did not simply apply the statutory text but considered 
various facts such as the ultimate goal of Accolade’s copying; the 
public benefit resulting from Accolade’s copying; and the fact that 
Accolade’s copying would not have too much impact on Sega 
because the consumers would buy more than one game.192  
2. Oracle America, Inc. v. Google LLC193 
In the 1990s, Sun Microsystems, Inc. (Sun) developed the 
Java platform, a software that can be used to “write and run programs 
in Java programming language,” for computer programming.194  With 
Java, programmers did not have to rewrite programs when they want 
to use the program on different computer hardware.195  The Java 2 
Standard Edition (Java SE) of the platform included the Java 
Application Programming Interface (API), which contained pre-
written Java source code that allowed programmers to build certain 
 
186 Id. 
187 Id. at 1523. 
188 Id. 
189 Id. at 1523-24. 
190 Id. at 1527-28. 
191 Id.  
192 Id. at 1523-24. 
193 886 F.3d 1179 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
194 Id. at 1186. 
195 Id.  
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functions without writing code from scratch.196  By 2008, Java SE 
included 166 API packages.197  Although the Java programming 
languages were free, some content spread across three packages 
within Java API library must be used; otherwise, the language would 
fail.198  In 2010, Oracle purchased Sun.199  Oracle made the Java 
platform freely available to programmers, but to attract programmers, 
Java was licensed with a fee to programmers who wanted to use the 
APIs in competing platforms, including mobile devices.200  
In 2005, Google acquired Android, Inc. to explore the mobile 
devices market.201  That same year, Google tried to negotiate with 
Sun to acquire a license, but the attempt failed.202  At the same time, 
the Android team attempted to create its own APIs but also failed.203  
In 2007, Google debuted its Android software platform for mobile 
devices, in which Google copied the code of “37 Java API packages 
– 11,500 lines of Oracle’s copyrighted code.”204  
Oracle sued Google for copyright and patent infringement in 
2010, and the Northern District of California ruled in favor of 
Google.205  Oracle appealed to the Federal Circuit, which reversed the 
case in part and remanded it to the district court in 2014.206  The 
Federal Circuit held that the Java API packages were copyrightable, 
and it remanded to the district court on the issue of whether Google’s 
use was acceptable under the fair use doctrine.207  Google appealed 
the Federal Circuit’s decision to the Supreme Court, but the writ of 
certiorari was denied in 2015.208  After a new trial in 2016, the jury 
found Google did not infringe Oracle’s copyrighted Java API 
 
196 Id.  
197 Id. 
198 Id. at 1187. 






205 Id. at 1188. 
206 Id.; see also Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 750 F.3d 1339, 1381 (Fed Cir. 
2014). 
207 Oracle, 886 F.3d at 1188; see Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 750 F.3d 1339, 
1376 (Fed Cir. 2014). 
208 Oracle, 886 F.3d at 1185. 
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packages because of the fair use defense.209  Oracle appealed to the 
Federal Circuit in 2018, and the court reversed and remanded the case 
to the district court.210  This time, the Federal Circuit held that 
Google’s use was not fair use, and the court remanded the case to the 
district court to decide the amount of money that Google should pay 
Oracle.211  Google petitioned for certiorari, which the Supreme Court 
granted in 2019.212 
Two substantive issues were presented to the Supreme Court: 
(1) whether copyright protection extends to a software interface; and 
(2) whether, as the jury found, Google’s use of a software interface in 
the context of creating a new computer program constitutes fair 
use.213  In the Federal Circuit court’s ruling in 2018, the court 
weighed the four factors of fair use, holding that Google’s use of Java 
API packages was not fair use.214  
For the purpose and character of the use factor, the Federal 
Circuit recognized that the factor had two main components: (1) 
whether the use was commercial in nature; and (2) whether the new 
work was transformative.215  Oracle also pointed out that courts have 
included bad faith in the purpose and character analysis.216 
Courts tend to find that a copyrighted use for commercial 
purposes is typically not fair use.217  The Federal Circuit nonetheless 
recognized that “the commercial use subfactor should not be unduly 
emphasized for it would lead to an overly restrictive view of fair 
use.”218  Thus, the court reasoned that “the degree to which the new 
user exploits the copyright for commercial gain . . . affects the weight 
 
209 Id. at 1189. 
210 Id. at 1186. 
211 Id. 
212 See Andrew Hamm, Google LLC v. Oracle America Inc., SCOTUSBLOG (Apr. 
29, 2019), https://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/google-llc-v-oracle-
america-inc/. 
213 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Google LLC v. Oracle Am., Inc., 140 S. Ct. 520 
(2019) (No. 18-956). 
214 Oracle, 886 F.3d at 1186. 
215 Id.at 1196. 
216 Id. 
217 Id. 
218 Id. at 1196-97 (quoting Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 
921 (2d Cir. 1994)). 
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we afford commercial nature as a factor.”219  The Federal Circuit 
disagreed with Google’s argument that its use was not commercial 
because Android was available open-source.220  The court explained 
that the fact that Android was free to the consumers did not make 
Google’s use non-commercial, and Google’s other potential non-
commercial motive did not matter here as a matter of law.221  The 
court also disagreed with Google’s argument that it did not gain 
profit directly but through advertisements,222 reasoning that “direct 
economic benefit was not required to demonstrate commercial 
use.”223  The Federal Circuit thus ruled in favor of Oracle on 
commercial use.224 
Google argued that its use was transformative because it used 
small parts of the Java API packages to create a new smartphone 
platform, a different market from Oracle’s computer field.225  
However, the Federal Circuit court denied this argument and 
reasoned that Google’s use did not fit within the statutory categories 
that are “looking to whether the use is for criticism, or comment, or 
news reporting, and the like.”226  Also, the API packages “served the 
same function in both works,”227 Google used the API packages for 
the benefit of developers because the developers were “familiar with 
the Java programming language.”228  Additionally, Google argued 
that it used only thirty-seven out of 166 API packages to write its 
own implementing code.229  However, the court rejected Google’s 
argument because the court reasoned that not only the quantity 
matters, so did the quality of the copied material.230  It did not matter 
whether Google had its own original code in the Android platform; 
the fact that Google failed to “alter[] the expressive content or 
 
219 Id. at 1197 (quoting Elvis Presley Enters., Inc. v. Passport Video, 349 F.3d 622, 
627 (9th Cir. 2003)). 
220 Oracle, 886 F.3d at 1197. 
221 Id. 
222 Id. 
223 Id. (quoting A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1015 (9th Cir. 
2001)). 
224 Id. at 1198. 
225 Id. at 1199. 
226 Id. (quoting Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578-79 (1994)). 
227 Order Denying JMOL, 2016 WL 3181206, at *8. 
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message of the original work” was enough for the court to rule 
against Google on this subfactor.231  Finally, the court reasoned that 
Google did not alter the original work by incorporating the API 
packages because Java SE APIs were in smartphones before Android 
entered the market.232  Thus, the court ruled in favor of Oracle on this 
subfactor.233 
The Federal Circuit used the Ninth Circuit’s ruling that “one 
who acts in bad faith should be barred from invoking the equitable 
defense of fair use.”234  Oracle argued that Google intentionally used 
the API packages and knew that it needed to have a license.235  
Google argued good faith based on industry custom.236  The court 
recognized that although bad faith may weigh against fair use, good 
faith was not a defense.237  Even if the jury found that Google’s use 
was based on good faith, the court ruled in favor of Oracle on this 
factor based on “the highly commercial and non-transformative 
nature of the use.”238 
For the nature of the copyrighted work factor, the court 
evaluated “whether the work was informational or creative.”239  As a 
rule mentioned in Campbell, “[c]reative expression falls within the 
core of the copyright’s protective purposes.”240  The Federal Circuit 
ruled in favor of Google on this factor because the evidence showed 
only that the API packages had met the “minimal degree of 
creativity”241 to be copyrightable; however, “the functional aspect of 
the packages” was also an important consideration.242  The evidence 
had shown that the API packages were functional, and Oracle failed 
to provide evidence explaining to the jury how to differentiate the 
functionality and creativity.243  However, the court also agreed with 
 
231 Id.at 1201. 
232 Id. 
233 Id.at 1202. 
234 Id. (quoting Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 436 (9th Cir. 1986)). 
235 Id. at 1203. 
236 Id. 
237 Id. 
238 Id. at 1204. 
239 Id. (quoting Worldwide Church of God v. Phila. Church of God, Inc., 227 F.3d 
1110, 1118 (9th Cir. 2000)). 
240 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 586 (1994). 
241 Oracle, 886 F.3d at 1204. 
242 Id. 
243 Id. at 1205. 
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the Ninth Circuit that this factor would not be very significant in the 
whole fair use analysis.244 
For the amount and substantiality of the portion used factor, 
the Federal Circuit agreed with the Ninth Circuit to evaluate both 
“the quantitative amount and qualitative value of the original work 
used in relation to the justification for its use.”245  The quantitative 
amount was not dispositive when the copied portion was significant 
qualitatively.246  The court found that Google copied 11,330 more 
lines than necessary to write in Java.247  Google argued that it did so 
to “avoid confusion among Java programmers as between the Java 
system and the Android system.”248  The court reasoned that use for 
purposes of “capitalizing on the popularity of the copyrighted work 
or to meet the expectations of intended customers” was not fair 
use.249  The Federal Circuit explained that even if the quantity that 
Google copied from Oracle’s copyrighted work was insignificant, no 
reasonable jury could find that it was also qualitatively 
insignificant.250  Google conceded it could have written the API 
differently to achieve the same functions.251  Thus, the court held that 
this factor was at most neutral in the fair use inquiry.252 
For the effect upon the potential market factor, the Federal 
Circuit evaluated the alleged infringer’s work’s potential market 
impact.253  The Ninth Circuit ruled that market harm “can be 
presumed where a use is ‘commercial and not transformative.’”254  
The Supreme Court explained that this factor may be weighed 
 
244 Id. (quoting Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 
1402 (9th Cir. 1997)). 
245 Id. (quoting Seltzer v. Green Day, Inc., 725 F.3d 1170, 1178 (9th Cir. 2013)). 
246 Id. 
247 Id. at 1206. 
248 Order Denying JMOL, 2016 WL 3181206, at *10-11. 
249 Oracle, 886 F.3d at 1206-07. 
250 Id. at 1207. 
251 Id.  
252 Id. 
253 Id. 
254 Id. (quoting Disney Enters., Inc. v. VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d 848, 861(9th Cir, 
2017)). 
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through a “sensitive balancing of interests.”255  The Federal Circuit 
applied the Supreme Court’s precedent.256 
When the court weighed this factor, the court evaluated both 
impacts on actual or potential market impact and on the “market for 
potential derivative uses, including those that creators of original 
works would, in general, develop or license others to develop.”257  
The court recognized that “[l]icensing Java SE for smartphones with 
increased processing capabilities” was one potential new market.258  
The fact that Oracle negotiated with Google about licensing also 
indicated that Oracle intended to license its work.259  Google argued 
that Java SE and Android did not compete in the same market; the 
court disagreed, reasoning that the fact that Oracle never entered the 
smartphone market was irrelevant here because the potential markets 
included “licensing others to develop derivative works.”260  Even if 
Google’s use did not have actual market harm, the potential impact 
alone would suffice for the court to establish the market impact.261 
The Federal Circuit ruled Google infringed Oracle’s copyright 
because its use was not fair use.262  The first factor and the fourth 
factor were heavily against Google.  
In Google’s Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Google made 
three arguments regarding the Federal Circuit court’s ruling in 2018 
on the fair use issue.263  First, Google pointed out that the Federal 
Circuit failed to consider the functional nature of software 
interfaces.264  Software interface, as a functional work, should be 
easier to prove fair use because “interfaces lie ‘at a distance from the 
 
255 Id. at 1208 (quoting Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 590 
(1994)). 
256 Id. 
257 Id. (quoting Campbell, 510 U.S. 569, 592). 
258 Id. at 1209. 
259 Id.; see Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google LLC, 886 F.3d 1179, 1187 (Fed. Cir. 2018).  
Google and Sun tried to reach an agreement but failed, for Google wanted device 
manufacturers to be able to use Oracle’s APIs in Android for free and to be able to 
freely modify the code, which would jeopardize Java platform’s “write once, run 
anywhere” philosophy. Id. 
260 Oracle, 886 F.3d at 1209-10. 
261 Id. at 1210. 
262 Id. 
263 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 11-32, Google LLC v. Oracle Am., Inc.,140 S. 
Ct. 520 (2019) (No. 18-956). 
264 Id. at 21. 
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core’ of copyright protection and are owed ‘a lower degree of 
protection than more traditional literary works.’”265  Second, Google 
argued that the Federal Circuit applied “transformative use” too 
rigidly.266  Google’s use was transformative because its use opened a 
new market for smartphones.267  Google used Java API declarations 
but only in a limited way to allow developers “to use the Java 
language to build applications for Android.”268  Such 
“interoperability was critical for developers” since they could make 
progress without having to use “entirely different interfaces in 
Android.”269  Finally, Google argued that the Federal Circuit erred in 
reasoning that just because “Oracle could have tried to adapt Java SE 
for use in smartphones, Google’s use … caused harm to a potential 
market.”270   
III. ANALYSIS 
On April 5, 2021, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in 
Google LLC v. Oracle America, Inc.271 and held that Google’s 
copying was fair use.272  The Supreme Court properly considered the 
public benefit when applying the fair use doctrine, although it failed 
to elaborate on its meaning. The Court also correctly held that 
Google’s use was transformative, although it failed to provide a 
definition of “transformative use.”  The Court correctly and carefully 
analyzed the market effect factor.  The Supreme Court’s decision is 
correct because it did not apply fair use to stifle creativity and 
provided some clarification of the fair use application.  The decision 
will have a positive effect on the technology industry. 
 
265 Id. at 23-24. 
266 Id. at 24. 
267 Id. at 25. 
268 Id. at 25-26. 
269 Id. at 26. 
270 Id. at 29. 
271 141 S. Ct. 1183 (2021). 
272 Id. at 1209. 
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A. The Supreme Court Correctly Incorporated the 
Public Benefit into the Fair Use Analysis, but it 
Failed to Provide A Detailed Analysis or Guideline 
to the Public Benefit Consideration 
In the Supreme Court decision, the Court incorporated the 
public benefits consideration into the market effects factor, which is 
the fourth factor.273  The Court noted that “[w]e do not say that these 
questions are always relevant to the application of fair use. Nor do we 
say that these questions are the only questions a court might ask. But 
we do find them relevant here in helping to determine the likely 
market effects of Google’s reimplementation.”274  The Court, 
however, failed to give it a deeper discussion. 
The statutory language has provided that unauthorized use is 
fair use “for the purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, 
teaching, scholarship, or research.”275  Those enumerated uses have 
one thing in common: the alleged infringer’s use provides societal 
benefit far beyond the alleged infringer’s personal commercial 
gain.276  Although it may be difficult for courts to value the external 
benefit, the Constitution requires copyright to encourage the public 
benefit.277  
Before Google developed the Android system, there was “no 
open-source, full-stack platform” in the smartphone market.278  
Google’s development of the Android system resulted in a 
“revolutionary, open-source mobile platform, completely different 
from any other approach.”279  Google then released the Android 
system to smartphone manufacturers free of charge and published the 
source code under an open-source license.280  Google’s use had a 
threefold public benefit: first, it benefitted the smartphone 
manufacturers so that the manufacturers do not have to buy 
Android’s system.  Second, it tremendously helped application 
 
273 Id. at 1206. 
274 Id. 
275 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
276 See Lydia Pallas Loren, Redefining the Market Failure Approach to Fair Use in 
An Era of Copyright Permission Systems, 5 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 49 (1997). 
277 Id. 
278 Brief of Defendant-Appellee, Oracle, 2017 WL 2305681 at *12 (May 22, 2017). 
279 Id. at 16. 
280 Id. at 17. 
32
Touro Law Review, Vol. 37, No. 2 [], Art. 16
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol37/iss2/16
2021 FAIR USE AND COMPUTER PROGRAMMING 989 
developers so that they do not have to acquire more knowledge (such 
as languages other than Java) to use Android and can use Android for 
free.  Third, the ease of using Android allowed application developers 
to express their ideas better, thus, developing more valuable 
applications that will be convenient for all smartphone users. 
The number of Android smartphone users in the United States 
increased to 120.5 million in 2018, and this figure is forecast to reach 
more than 130 million in 2021,281 not to mention the number of 
Android smartphone users across the world.282  If Google had 
developed Android from scratch, Google might have taken longer or 
even failed to successfully develop Android.  If so, the smartphone 
market, application developers, and Android smartphone users would 
suffer a tremendous loss.   
It is hard, however, to define or measure the public benefit.  
What is the public benefit?  What kind of use can have a public 
benefit?  What is the scope of public benefit?  Does the use benefit 
the public’s ability to be educated or enhance their ability to gain 
commercially?  Because we live in a digital world, the scope of 
accessibility and the monetary value of the individual user is hard for 
courts to measure.  How many people can, have, or will use the 
alleged copyright infringing software?  Do they have to pay for using 
it?  These are the unsolved questions presented in front of the courts. 
Courts may be reluctant to consider the public benefit because 
every use could have some degree of public benefit.  In that case, all 
uses would be fair use, which would render the whole fair use 
analysis meaningless.  Further, if any usage that has some degree of 
public benefit could be fair use, companies and developers would 
have fewer incentives to put efforts into developing new software or 
technology since their products may not be protected by copyright.  
Moreover, although the statutory factors set forth in 17 U.S.C. § 107 
are not exhaustive, courts are unwilling to go beyond the four factors 
when considering the fair use defense. 
 
281 S. O’Dea, Number of Android smartphone users in the United States from 2014 
to 2021, STATISTA (Mar. 1, 2021) 
https://www.statista.com/statistics/232786/forecast-of-andrioid-users-in-the-us/.  
282 Allan Jay, Number of Smartphone and Mobile Phone Users Worldwide in 
2021/2022: Demographics, Statistics, Predictions, FINANCESONLINE, 
https://financesonline.com/number-of-smartphone-users-worldwide/ (last visited 
Apr. 2, 2021). 
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Although it may be difficult for courts to measure and apply 
public benefit in the fair use analysis, this is not an excuse for courts 
to disregard this consideration.  The Supreme Court has previously 
recognized the importance of the public benefit value when 
determining the fair use defense.  For example, the Court noted in 
Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken283 that “[t]he limited scope 
of the copyright holder’s statutory monopoly … reflects a balance of 
competing claims upon the public interest ….”284  In Williams & 
Wilkin Co. v. U.S.285 the Court noted that “[C]ourts in passing upon 
particular claims of infringement must occasionally subordinate the 
copyright holder’s interest in a maximum financial return to the 
greater public interest in the development of art, science and 
industry.”286  In Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, 
Inc.287 the Court held that: 
 
The monopoly privileges that Congress may authorize 
are neither unlimited nor primarily designed to 
provide a special private benefit.  Rather, the limited 
grant is a means by which an important public purpose 
may be achieved.  It is intended to motivate the 
creative activity of authors and inventors by the 
provisions of a special reward, and to allow the public 
access to the products of their genius after the limited 
period of exclusive control has expired.288 
 
Several Federal Circuits have also added the public benefit 
consideration into the fair use analysis.  For example, in Sega, the 
Ninth Circuit considered the public benefit “resulting from a 
particular use notwithstanding the fact that the alleged infringer may 
 
283 422 U.S. 151 (1975). 
284 See Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (noting 
that the ultimate goal of copyright is to stimulate artistic creativity for general 
public good). 
285 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973) 
286 Id. at 1352 (quoting Berlin v. E.C. Publ’n, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 
303, 307 (2d Cir. 1966)). 
287 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
288 Id. at 429; see also Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 574-76 
(1994) (directing courts to consider public benefits). 
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gain commercially.”289  Additionally, public benefit “need not be 
direct or tangible, but may arise because the challenged use serves a 
public interest.”290  In Wright v. Warner Books, Inc.291 the Second 
Circuit held that when considering the effect on the market, the court 
must balance “the benefit the public will derive if the use is permitted 
and the personal gain the copyright owner will receive if the use is 
denied.”292  Another good example is the decision in Authors Guild v. 
Google, Inc,293 where Google provided a searchable database of 
books and snippet views so that the user could search for the books 
but would not have access to the substantial book content.294  At trial, 
Judge Chin ruled in favor of Google and reasoned that: 
 
In my view, Google Books provides significant public 
benefits.  It advances the progress of the arts and 
sciences, while maintaining respectful consideration 
for the rights of authors and other creative individuals, 
and without adversely impacting the rights of 
copyright holders.  It has become an invaluable 
research tool that permits students, teachers, librarians, 
and others to more efficiently identify and locate 
books.  It has given scholars the ability, for the first 
time, to conduct full-text searches of tens of millions 
of books.  It preserves books, in particular out-of-print 
and old books that have been forgotten in the bowels 
of libraries, and it gives them new life.  It facilitates 
access to books for print-disabled and remote or 
underserved populations.  It generates new audiences 
 
289 Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1523 (9th Cir. 1992) (fitting 
the public benefit consideration into the first fair use factor). 
290 Id.; see also Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1165 (“[A] 
search engine provides social benefit by incorporating an original work into a new 
work, namely, an electronic reference tool.”); Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 
811, 820 (holding that Arriba’s use of Kelly’s had public benefit by enhancing 
internet’s information-gathering techniques). 
291 953 F.2d 731 (2d Cir. 1991). 
292 Wright v. Warner Books, Inc., 953 F.2d 731, 739 (2d Cir. 1991); see also MCA, 
Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180, 183 (2d Cir. 1981) (fitting the public benefit 
consideration into the fourth fair use factor). 
293 804 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 2015). 
294 Id. 
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and creates new sources of income for authors and 
publishers. Indeed, all society benefits.295 
 
Although the Supreme Court reasoned that the public benefit 
consideration was relevant in this case and incorporated the 
consideration into the fourth factor, the Court failed to explain further 
how the public benefit should be considered and analyzed.  To make 
it easier for lower courts to consider the public benefits properly, the 
Supreme Court should have provided a more detailed analysis or 
guideline to the public benefit consideration, or the Court should 
have at least given a clear definition of public benefit. 
B. The Supreme Court Correctly Held that Google’s 
Use is Transformative, but it Failed to Provide a 
Clear Definition of “Transformative Use” 
Transformative uses generally “involve the addition of labor 
to create value, whether that labor is in building an interpretive 
scaffold around a work, changing the work to send a different 
message, or putting the work together with numerous other works in 
order to search across them.”296  After Campbell, the lower courts 
have split transformative use into two contexts: transformative-
content and transformative use.297  Transformative use means the 
alleged infringer “transforms the original work for a new purpose.”298  
Transformative content means the alleged infringer “uses part of the 
original work to create a new meaning.”299   
For transformative purpose, changing the content in the alleged 
infringer’s work is not necessary.  Transformative purpose generally 
 
295 Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google Inc., 954 F. Supp. 2d 282, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), 
aff’d, 804 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 2015); see also Leval, supra note 124, at 1111 (noting 
that the secondary use “adds value to the original” is the goal of enrichment of 
society that the fair use doctrine intends to achieve). 
296 Rebecca Tushnet, Content, Purpose, or Both, 90 WASH. L. REV. 869, 891-92 
(2015). 
297 Brief of Eight Intellectual Property Scholars as Amici Curiae supporting 
Petitioner at 4, Google LLC v. Oracle Am. Inc, 140 S. Ct. 520 (2019) (No. 18-956). 
298 Id.; see Tushnet, supra note 296, at 869-90. 
299 Brief of Eight Intellectual Property Scholars as Amici Curiae supporting 
Petitioner at 4, Google LLC v. Oracle Am. Inc, 140 S. Ct. 520 (2019) (No. 18-956); 
see Tushnet, supra note 296, at 869-90. 
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means that the defendant “has a different interpretive or 
communicative project than the plaintiff did in creating the original 
work.”300  Courts have held some uses infringe on copyright but are 
fair use, even if the alleged infringer used the exact copy as originals.  
For example, courts have held in some cases that using copyrighted 
work in search engines is an allowable transformative purpose.  In 
Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., the Second Circuit held that Google’s 
searchable books had a transformative purpose for it “provide[s] 
otherwise unavailable information about the originals.”301  The search 
function’s purpose was for users to “gain significant information 
about the books,” and the snippet view “adds importantly to the 
highly transformative purpose of identifying books of interest to the 
searcher.”302  In other cases, the courts ruled in favor of the alleged 
infringer when it selectively copied the original works without 
changing the content.303  
However, the circuit courts disagreed over what constitutes 
transformative use.  For example, the Second Circuit held that “[t]o 
qualify as a fair use under copyright law, a new work generally must 
alter the original with new expression, meaning, or message.”304  In a 
Ninth Circuit case,305 the court agreed with the Second Circuit’s 
 
300 Tushnet, supra note 296, at 878.  
301 Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d at 215; see also Perfect 10, Inc. v. 
Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007); Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 
F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003). 
302 Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d at 217-18. 
303 Tushnet, supra note 296, at 877; see also Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling 
Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605 (2d Cir. 2006); Am. Inst. of Physics v. Winstead PC 
No. 3:12-CV-1230-M, 2013 WL 6242843 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 3, 2013) (finding 
patent-related copying a fair use and transformative); Denison v. Larkin, No. 1:14-
CV-01470, 2014 WL 3953637 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 13, 2014) (finding that disciplinary 
use had a different purpose than blogger’s purpose of exposing alleged courtroom 
corruption).  
304 Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 705-08 (2d Cir. 2013); see The Andy Warhol 
Foundation v. Goldsmith, 992 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 2021) (holding that the artist’s print 
illustration of musician based on the copyright owner photographer’s photo of the 
musician was not transformative since it did not significantly alter or add any 
elements). 
305 Seltzer v. Green Day, Inc., 725 F.3d 1170, 1177 (9th Cir. 2013) (“[A]n allegedly 
infringing work is typically viewed as transformative as long as new expressive 
content or message is apparent, this is so even where—as here—the allegedly 
infringing work makes few physical changes to the original or fails to comment on 
the original.”). 
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approach and held that the junior work had to be transformative, even 
though the junior work only minimally modified the original work.306  
On the other hand, in a Seventh Circuit case,307 the court criticized 
the Second Circuit’s approach as being too broad and argued that it 
would result in a conflict with the protection of derivative works 
under 17 U.S.C. § 106(2).308 
The Federal Circuit in Oracle took the narrow view of 
transformative use by only examining the statutory language and held 
that Google’s use did not fall within the categories of “criticism, or 
comment, or news reporting, and the like”309 mentioned in the statute.  
However, the precedent cases demonstrated that the factors in § 107 
never intended to be exhaustive.310  The software code was written by 
developers to achieve certain functions, which would almost never 
fall within the categories listed in the statute.  If courts apply this 
narrow test and disregard the utilitarian nature of the software, it 
would be difficult for software developers to use fair use as a 
defense.  Thus, the Federal Circuit’s holding was too narrow and 
rigid since the court only looked at a few non-exhaustive categories 
listed in the statute and failed to consider the functional nature of the 
software. 
Further, the Federal Circuit used the transformative content 
test and held that Google’s use was not transformative since it failed 
to “alter the expressive content or message of the original work.”311  
However, this holding “was against many precedent cases, which did 
not focus on the work of the second creator.”312  As an amicus curiae 
 
306 Id. at 1176-78. 
307 Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation LLC, 766 F.3d 756 (7th Cir. 2014) (questioning the 
Second Circuit’s transformative use test set forth in Cariou because the test asks 
exclusively whether the work is transformative and replaces the list in 17 U.S.C. § 
107 and would also override derivative works protection set forth in 17 U.S.C. § 
106(2)).  
308 Id. at 758-59. 
309 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578-89 (1994). 
310 Id. at 577-78. 
311 Oracle, 886 F.3d at 1201. 
312 See, e.g., Seltzer v. Green Day, Inc., 725 F.3d 1170, 1177 (9th Cir. 2013) (“[A 
work is transformative] as long as new expressive content or message is 
apparent . . . even where . . . the allegedly infringing work makes few physical 
changes to the original.”).  
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brief313 pointed out, “software interfaces allow developers to write 
software that is interoperable and independent of the underlying 
hardware.”314  It also noted that the developer community has its own 
standard and universal practices to meet the tremendous need of 
developing new software, such as rely on “libraries common software 
function written by others” to avoid the need to recode, coordinate 
with each other and “create interoperable code modules” that can be 
connected to make the larger programming work, isolate the 
hardware and software installed on it, and adopt a standardized 
platform to bridge the gap between the hardware and software.315  
Thus, under the Federal Circuit’s standard, software 
developers would have to rewrite the code every time even to achieve 
the same function.  This would slow developers’ progress and thus 
impede creativity.  The Federal Circuit had thus failed to consider the 
functional nature of the software and customary practices in the 
software industry. 
The Supreme Court reversed and held that Google’s use was 
transformative.316  The Court noted that Google copied the portions 
of APIs precisely for the purpose of “enabl[ing] programmers to call 
up implementing programs that would accomplish particular 
tasks.”317  The Court recognized that since it was the software 
industry’s common practice, stopping the analysis here would 
“severely limit the scope [of] fair use in the functional context of 
computer programs.”318  Google uses APIs to create new products 
and it seeks to “expand the use and usefulness of Android-based 
smartphones.”319  The Court reasoned that Google’s use to “create a 
new platform that could be readily used by programmers was 
consistent with that creative ‘progress’ that is the basic constitutional 
objective of copyright itself.”320  Google’s use is transformative 
because Google “provided a new collection of tasks operating in a 
 
313 Brief for Developers Alliance as Amicus Curiae supporting Petitioner at 6, 
Google LLC v. Oracle Am., Inc, 140 S. Ct. 520 (2019) (No. 18-956). 
314 Id. at 5. 
315 Id. at 6. 
316 Google LLC v. Oracle America, Inc., 141 S. Ct. 1183, 1204 (2021). 
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distinct and different computing environment.”321  The Court also 
recognized that Google’s reuse of APIs is also common in the 
software industry as demonstrated by several of the amici briefs.322 
Although the Court made the correct decision that Google’s 
use was transformative and rejected the narrow view of 
transformative use taken by the Federal Circuit, the Court failed to 
provide a clear standard and definition for what constitutes 
“transformative use.”  The lower courts would use their own 
definition and standard of “transformative use,” which would cause 
confusion and encourage judicial forum shopping.  The best solution 
for this dilemma is for the Supreme Court to provide a clearer 
definition of “transformative use.”  Otherwise, this unpredictable 
issue will impair software developers’ creativity and give copyright 
holders too much monopoly power, which consequently suppresses 
expression and goes against copyright law’s purpose.  
C. Supreme Court Correctly Decided that Google did 
not Harm Oracle’s Actual or Potential Market 
Courts should not weigh the market impact factor (factor 
four) too heavily.  The software industry grows rapidly, and software 
companies always want to explore and enter different markets to both 
make profits and create new devices and processes to make people’s 
lives more convenient.  It is normal for software companies to make 
efforts to enter new markets regardless of their success.  Also, 
software users are likely to use different types of software; each 
software may serve various functions.  Courts should not hold the 
alleged infringer liable for copyright infringement merely because the 
copyright owner attempts to enter the same market as the alleged 
infringer and thus the alleged infringer impairs the original work’s 
potential market.  Otherwise, software companies may hesitate when 
they decide to explore new markets.  This may also give software 
copyright holders monopoly power in certain markets, even if they do 
not ever actually enter the market: they should not have “reserved” a 
seat in the market. 
In the Supreme Court’s decision, the Court held that Google 
did not harm the markets for Java SE because Oracle failed to enter 
 
321 Id. 
322 Id at 1203-04. 
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the smartphone market.323  Sun’s (now Oracle’s) main market was 
laptops and desktops, and Sun “was poorly positioned to succeed in 
the mobile phone market.”324  Google’s Android system was “part of 
a distinct (and more advanced) market than Java software.”325  Sun 
failed to enter the smartphone market, which is a market that 
“increasingly demanded a new form of smartphone technology.”326  
Finally, considering the difficulties to create similar APIs “with 
similar appeal to programmers,” enforcing Oracle’s copyright would 
actually harm the public.327  As the Supreme Court recognized, 
“Oracle alone would hold the key.”328  Although Oracle as a 
copyright holder could earn enormous profits, the profits “could well 
flow from creative improvements, new applications, and new uses 
developed by users who have learned to work with that interface.”329  
Enforcing Oracle’s copyright would limit creativity, which is 
inconsistent with Congress’s intent.330 
The Supreme Court correctly decided not to grant Oracle 
monopoly power.  Technology grows fast and technology companies 
use their best efforts to create new software and explore new fields 
and markets.  If a copyright owner holds the only “key,” this power 
will have a negative impact on the technology companies’ creativity.  
D. Supreme Court Should Have Provided A Clear 
Standard of Applying the Four Factors of the Fair 
Use Defense and How to Weigh Them 
The 17 U.S.C. § 107 enumerates only four non-exhaustive 
factors when applying the fair use defense.  However, it did not 
provide guidelines for the relative weight of the four factors.  So far, 
the Supreme Court has adopted two approaches in evaluating the 
factors.  In Harper & Row, the Court stated that the fourth factor, 
which required courts to “consider the effect on potential market,” 
 
323 Google LLC v. Oracle America, Inc., 141 S. Ct. 1183, 1206 (2021). 
324 Id.  
325 Id. at 1207. 
326 Id. 
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was “the most important element of fair use.”331  On the other hand, 
in Campbell, the Court introduced “transformative use” and held that 
this was the key factor when deciding the fair use defense.332  
Lower courts have struggled to reconcile the two standards.  
For example, the Third Circuit held that Campbell rejected Harper, 
and the correct way to apply fair use was to consider all aspects and 
weigh the results together.333  On the other hand, the Second Circuit 
weighed the fourth factor as the most important factor.334  The 
Seventh Circuit held that the “transformative use” overlapped with 
the “derivative work” test.335  In the Ninth Circuit, both standards 
were presented, and the court has never given a clear solution to 
resolve this dilemma.336  
As an amicus curiae brief written by eight intellectual 
property scholars337 supporting Google said: 
 
This confusion exemplifies the clash between two 
competing paradigms of fair use – “transformative 
use” and “market-centered.” This Court’s Harper 
holding stems from a “market-centered” view, which 
tolerates limiting fair use when it “disrupts the 
copyright market without a commensurate public 
benefit.” In adopting the “transformative use” test in 
Campbell, this Court accepted a broader vision for the 
fair use standard first articulated by Judge Leval. But 
by not doing so explicitly, the debate unnecessarily 
 
331 Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 579 (1994). 
332 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994). 
333 Murphy v. Millennium Radio Grp. LLC, 650 F.3d 295, 306 (3d Cir. 2011). 
334 See, e.g., Fox Broad. Co. v. Dish Network, LLC, 723 F.3d 1067, 1076 (2d Cir. 
2013). 
335 See Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation LLC, 766 F.3d 756 (7th Cir. 2014). 
336 See, e.g., Seltzer v. Green Day, Inc., 725 F.3d 1170, 1175 (9th Cir. 2013) 
(holding that the court should explore all four factors and evaluate the results 
together); Monge v. Maya Magazines, Inc., 688 F.3d 1164, 1180 (9th Cir. 2012) 
(holding that the fourth factor is the most important). 
337 The authors are Michael Kasdan, Orly Lobel, Lydia Loren, Mark McKenna, 
Lateef Mtima, Elizabeth L. Rosenblatt, Christopher B. Seaman, and Rebecca 
Tushnet. 
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dragged on for more than twenty years, leaving behind 
a trial of unpredictable decisions.338 
 
The Supreme Court should have provided a clear standard of 
how to apply the four factors of the fair use defense and how to 
weigh those factors.  “An intra-circuit split accompanied by an inter-
circuit divide followed by lack of conformity to a Supreme Court 
decision normally warrants en banc review.”339  
When analyzing the four fair use factors, at least in the cases 
involving the software industry, courts should consider the functional 
nature of software and not the transformative content test but the 
transformative purpose test.  After all, computer code is “a set of 
instructions that performs the same function whenever it is used.”340  
If courts focus on whether the alleged infringer altered the original 
work’s content, the developers would have to develop new software 
from scratch and cannot use something they already know to speed 
up the process.  The developers may thus lose incentive to create new 
software, which will be contrary the copyright law’s goal to promote 
progress.   
IV. CONCLUSION 
Few cases have addressed the fair use defense issue in the 
software area.  Oracle v. Google, as the most important case in the 
software area, will have a great impact on the technology industry.  
The Supreme Court’s decision in Oracle correctly applied the fair use 
doctrine because the Court did not apply the fair use doctrine 
narrowly, and it protected the software developer’s creativity.  
However, the Supreme Court should have provided a clear standard 
for the fair use doctrine and discussed the standard in greater detail.  
The clearer approach would make the result more predictable and not 
impair software developers’ ability to express their ideas and develop 
 
338 Brief of Eight Intellectual Property Scholars as Amici Curiae supporting 
Petitioner at 9, Google LLC v. Oracle Am., Inc, 140 S. Ct. 520 (2019) (No. 18-
956). 
339 Id. at 9-10 (quoting Int’l Union v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 872 F.3d 388, 390 (6th 
Cir. 2017). 
340 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 27, Google LLC v. Oracle Am., Inc.,140 S. Ct. 
520 (2019) (No. 18-956). 
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more convenient applications that can benefit humanity.  It will also 
make it easier for the lower courts to apply the fair use defense.   
This Note does not call for the Supreme Court to provide a 
bright-line fair use analysis, which would make the fair use defense 
overly narrow and contrary to the legislative intent.  Instead, this 
Note agrees with the Supreme Court’s decision but calls for the Court 
to go further and clarify ambiguities in the fair use doctrine.  In this 
way, the lower courts can focus more on the facts themselves when 
applying the fair use defense instead of struggling with the 
interpretation of the ambiguities.   
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